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Drugs under the Constitution 
 





In this paper, I will analyze the constitutional implications of criminalizing a number of 
drug-related conducts, including the use and provision of drugs. I will address these 
issues from the perspective of the different rights at stake, especially the right to 
autonomy, and discuss Arriola,2 a decision adopted by the Argentine Supreme Court in 
2009 which, for a combination of arguments, declares the criminalization of drug 
possession for personal use unconstitutional.   
 
As I will show, the arguments in favor of holding the criminalization of drug use 
unconstitutional have implications on the regulation of drug provision which are 
different from those the Court assumes in Arriola. Courts and scholars have invoked the 
right to autonomy to decriminalize drug use, but have advocated for severe punishment 
of provision and for compulsory detoxification treatments. To justify this approach, they 
have oscillated between two images of the drug user which, in fact, are inconsistent: on 
the one hand, an autonomous agent who pursues her freely chosen life plan; on the 
other, a sort of automaton with no will who gives in to the influence exerted by the 
                                                 
1 Director of the Law Department, Universidad de San Andrés. I wish to thank the Programa de 
Asistencia a la Investigación (PAI) of Universidad de San Andrés for providing financial 
support to this paper and to Sergio Giuliano for his valuable help. Also, Joaquín Millón, Julio 
César Rivera (h), and Sebastián Elias, with whom I discussed the arguments in this paper.  
2 Supreme Court, August 25, 2009.  
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person who shares or sells drugs. This ambiguity is hard to maintain, and forces us to 
re-evaluate the regime in force.  
 
As an alternative to what I consider unredeemable inconsistencies, I will propose an 
interpretation of the Argentine Constitution according to which the scope of the right to 
autonomy is different –wider in one dimension, narrower in another– than the one 
courts and scholars have tended to defend. Moreover, I will submit that there are other 
rights involved which provide better justifications for decriminalizing certain drug-
related activities, while authorizing specific state interventions that constrain drug use. 
 
In sum, I will present a more complex picture –more sensitive to differences between 
drugs, and with more rights involved– than the one that has prevailed so far in the 
discussions on this matter in Argentina.  Despite the localism entailed in any 
constitutional argument, I hope the analysis will be general enough to be applied, 
mutatis mutandi, to other countries. 
 
 
2. The Doctrine in Force 
 
Article 19 of the Argentine Constitution states: 
 
“Private actions which in no manner offend order and public morality, nor harm third 
parties, are only reserved to God, and exempt from the authority of magistrates. No 
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inhabitant of the Nation shall be forced to do what the law does not impose, nor 
deprived of what the law does not forbid.”3 
 
In the last decades, once and again our Supreme Court had to decide whether this 
provision was consistent with laws criminalizing drug possession for personal use. The 
first approach taken by the courts was that article 19 did not preclude such laws. This 
tendency was reversed in 1986, in the Bazterrica4case, a milestone of the democratic 
springtime the country was enjoying at the time. In Bazterrica, the Court holds that any 
action which does not entail harm to others is protected under article 19. Carlos Nino, 
leading advocate of this liberal interpretation of article 19 and a source of inspiration for 
the Court, claims that this provision prohibits “any legal interference with actions which 
do not affect the legitimate interests of third parties, even if such actions represent a 
deviation from certain models of personal virtue and have the effect of self-degrading 
the person who performs them.”5 
 
The reign of Bazterrica was brief. In 1989, the Court, packed under Menem’s 
administration, left aside this precedent and refloated the pre-democratic understanding 
of article 19.6 Some 20 years later, another new Court returned in Arriola to Bazterrica, 
in particular to the most decidedly liberal opinions in it.  
 
                                                 
3Translated by the author. 
4Fallos 308:1392. 
5 Nino, “¿Es la tenencia de drogas con fines de consumo personal una de las acciones privadas de los 
hombres?”, in Miller, Gelli, Cayuso, Constitución y derechos humanos, p. 570, at 573.  Translation by the 
author.  
6In re Montalvo, Fallos: 313:1333. 
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While I have no doubts that Arriola reaches the right outcome, I have 
elsewhere7criticized its argumentative style, and especially its being more concerned 
with the enunciation of big principles–supported by references to Dworkin, Hobbes, 
Locke, and Seneca– than with the tailoring of relevant distinctions. Not surprisingly, 
Arriola’s argumentation defects, which I was certainly not the only one to note,8 have 
rendered it a poor guide for trial courts, prosecutors, the police, and citizens in general. 
Basic issues have given rise to different interpretations and inconsistent decisions, and 
two years after Arriola was decided, 54% of all national prosecutions refer to drug use.9 
 
Among Arriola’s various considerations, the “principle of personal autonomy” occupies 
a central place. Citing the Inter American Court of Human Rights (one of the Argentine 
Court’s favorite sources), it emphasizes that, as a corollary of that principle, individuals 
must enjoy the capacity to lead their lives in an autonomous manner, free from undue 
interference inspired in oppressive attempts to “enlighten their decisions”.10 Thus, the 
Court understands that, for the individual to pursue her life plan autonomously, 
Government must refrain from interfering with conduct that does not harm others, in 
line with Nino’s position on the matter. 
 
Under this interpretation, numerous actions are excluded from the protection of article 
19 because, as Nino and the Court understand it, they harm third parties. Thus, Nino 
acknowledges that actions such as sharing drugs, inducing others to use them, and using 
them in public are not protected. These actions, says Nino, are “contagious,” and, along 
                                                 
7“El maximalismo en las decisiones de la Corte Suprema”, Revista de Derecho Constitucional, 
La Ley, Edición 75° Aniversario, 2010. 
8For a critique of Arriola’s argumentative dispersion, see Alberto Garay, “Breve nota a la 
sentencia dictada en el caso Arriola”, JA 2009-III, suplemento del fascículo 14, p. 48. 
9 See report by the Ministerio Público de la Nación of December 27, 2011, in file with the 
author. 
10Arriola, first opinion, par. 17.  
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with the sale of drugs, can be punished.11 Along the same lines, Argentine courts that 
endorsed the more liberal interpretation of article 19 have always endeavor to 
distinguish public from private use, in order to exclude only the latter from punishment, 
and have never questioned the criminalization of sharing and selling drugs, among 
many other drug-related conducts.12 
 
The underlying assumption of this approach is that taking drugs is bad. Therefore, any 
conduct which in any manner induces or at least makes it possible for others to use 
drugs entails harm to third parties, and deserves no protection under article 19. In fact, 
using drugs in the presence of another person is enough for the harming effect to take 
place, and this conduct can be punished for its “contagion effect.” 
 
Nino provides an additional argument to justify “severe” punishment of drug sale and 
provision in general –akrasia, or weakness of will. Nino believes that the existence of 
this phenomenon provides the basis for certain paternalist measures, such as the 
obligation to wear helmets or fasten seatbelts. The idea is that, although the individual 
acknowledges that it is preferable to do so and thus minimize risk in case of accident, 
laziness, social pressure, or other factors may prevent her from acting accordingly. In 
such case, the legal obligation backed by a fine helps the individual to strengthen her 
will and act as she, in the abstract, deems as the better option.  
 
                                                 
11Ética y derechos humanos (1984), p. 441-2; Fundamentos de derecho constitucional (1992), p. 
312. 
12 In Arriola, par. 28 of the first opinion, the Court points out that, pursuant to international 
covenants, Argentina is under the duty to “assure coordination of prevention and repression of 
illegal drug dealing, adopting necessary measures to criminalize and regard as intentional 
crimes accordingly punished with incarceration the growing, production, manufacture, 
extraction, preparation, sale, distribution … transportation, importation, and exportation of 
drugs…” The Court finds such repression fully compatible with decriminalizing drug use. See 
par. 27 and 28 of the first opinion.  
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In the case at hand, says Nino, the possibility of akrasia and other autonomy defects 
also justifies “making access to drugs extremely difficult [by] punishing traffic and 
provision severely, and adopting measures of rehabilitation of drug addicts.The harder 
the access to drugs, the more opportunities there will be for individuals to become 
aware of their harmful effects and to ponder if they really value so intensely what they 
pursue through drugs as to expose themselves to the deterioration of other personal 
goods. On the other hand, resorting to rehabilitation measures, even compulsorily, does 
not seem objectionable…”13 
 
Also Petracchi, in his opinion in Bazterrica, finds the basis for punishing provision, 
particularly sale, in autonomy defects: 
 
“[N]ot all decisions are made by individuals in a state of mind that entails that they have 
considered what is best for them after free rational deliberation. The absolute lack of 
will derived from pathologic dependence. . . impedes ‘free’ decisionmaking, and the 
State can and must interfere with the activities of others who take advantage, promote, 
or exploit such states, pushing he who suffers from them to walk through the 
irreversible paths of certain forms of addiction which lead, with no stops, to an 
overwhelming death… It is thus unquestionably fair to punish the dealer, for reasons 
which do not apply to the user (article 83, Criminal Code).”14 
 
The article of the Criminal Code Petracchi cites criminalizes assistance to suicide. The 
argument, then, is that the person who attempts suicide is not punished (nor the one who 
                                                 
13 Nino, “¿Es la tenencia de drogas para consumo personal una de las acciones privadas de los 
hombres?”, La Ley, 1979-D-743. 
14Bazterrica, Petracchi’s opinion, par. 17. 
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succeeds, of course), but the person who assists or instigates suicide is. The same, 
according to Petracchi, applies to drugs.  
 
Petracchi also resorts to this image of the user with no will to refute the argument 
connecting prosecution of drug use and drug dealing. Says the Justice: “Claiming that 
punishing the user allows reducing demand and therefore the dealer’s business is like 
asserting that the protection of life creates the conditions that make homicides 
possible.”15According to this analogy, the buyer of drugs is not responsible for the 
transaction –he is just a passive victim. Moreover, in this case Petracchi is not even 
referring to the addict, but rather extends the image of the individual with no will to all 
drug users. The idea is that the dealer must be punished because she takes advantage of 
the state of defenselessness and lack of will of the user, and profits from harming him.  
 
In sum, under the dominant doctrine there are three types of reasons to criminalize sale 
or free provision of drugs: first, this action harms third parties because it promotes or 
makes it possible that they inflict harm upon themselves; secondly, punishing provision 
is a way of hampering access to drugs, and therefore of forcing the potential user to 
think it twice before harming herself; thirdly, specifically in the case of sale, the drug 
dealer makes profit by harming someone whose will is compromised. The first of these 
arguments also justifies criminalization of public use. The second, that strict, 
compulsory detoxification measures be adopted. The three of them assume that the drug 
user is not in command of her actions –she is, rather, a passive victim.  
 
  
                                                 
15Bazterrica, Petracchi’s opinion, par. 18. 
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3. Some Problems 
 
A drug user who has followed the preceding discussion might experience some 
perplexity. On the one hand, he has heard that his conduct is inherent to his right to 
autonomy, and is therefore constitutionally protected from “any legal interference.” On 
the other, he finds out he can only use drugs in private, or else he might end up in jail; 
and he must obtain drugs in a black market dominated by mafias, with all the risks and 
costs this implies, for any form of provision deserves harsh punishment. Moreover, 
since the State is under the duty to seize all goods illegally acquired, if it finds a drug 
user in possession of drug, it should necessarily deprive him of that drug and proceed to 
destroy it. In fact, our disconcerted user will find out that few actions are persecuted by 
the State’s apparatus with as much eagerness as drug provision.16 He might find some 
consolation in the fact that he can get drugs all the same, but he cannot forget that this is 
so despite the State, which devotes vast resources to prevent it. 
 
According to Nino, drug use can be regarded as a central part of an individual’s life 
plan; this justifies respecting the individual’s decision to harm herself and tolerating 
potential distress she may cause to others, including to those people who depend on her 
or are affectively linked to her. But, if this is so, how should we understand all the 
measures that, we are told, the State can lawfully impose to interfere with drug use? 
 
                                                 
16See report by the Ministerio Público de la Nación, note 6 supra. Note that I am not counting as 
a consequence of the doctrine in force that fact that, as this report reveals, 54% of all 
prosecutions initiated in by the National prosecutor refer to possession of drugs for personal use. 
Obviously, this fact could be intimidating to the potential user, but I am not attributing this 
consequence to the prevailing doctrine because this seems to be an anomaly that could be 
potentially solved. In other words, I am focusing on the effects that necessarily follow from this 
doctrine, not its deviations or enforcement deficiencies.  
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As we saw, Nino resorts to the idea of akrasia to justify hampering access to drugs, so 
that the potential user is forced to think it over. However, the disproportion between 
such goal and the measures that Nino actually tolerates or advocates for is so substantial 
that the argument loses its grip. How could it be possible that the only way in which an 
autonomous conduct, part of the agent’s life plan, can be performed is by breaking the 
law to get drugs in the black market? It seems especially problematic that such is the 
implication of Nino’s position, given his commitment to law abiding and his general 
critique to Argentina’s anomy.17 
 
The tension is evident. On the one hand, the act of using drugs is presented as 
autonomous conduct performed as part of a life plan, thus exempted from all 
interference by the State by virtue of article 19.One the other, the user is portrayed as 
someone whose will is compromised, with no freedom to decide by herself–not the 
subject of her own life, but rather the object of the perverse plans of others. If this 
second portrait was accurate, there would be little space for article 19 in our analysis. 
Instead, the idea of victim, which the Court certainly invokes,18  would surface, but such 
idea would only make sense once we have discarded the assumption of an autonomous 
agent –and the protection of article 19 alongside.  
 
This tension is more apparent when we analyze the arguments presented to justify the 
criminalization of the sharing of drugs and other “contagious” conducts, in particular 
public use. Recall that both Nino and the Court endeavor to distinguish public from 
private use. However, if the individual can autonomously decide whether to use drugs 
                                                 
17 This paradox was rightly brought to my attention by Sergio Giuliano. Nino’s position 
regarding anomy can be found in Un país al margen de la ley (1992). 
18Arriola, par. 19 of the first opinion. 
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or not, why should we underestimate her ability to accept or decline an invitation? Why 
should we be so afraid of contagion and imitation when we are dealing with adults who 
autonomously choose how to live their lives? After all, to assume that the mere fact that 
Juana offers drugs to Pablo or uses drugs in his presence is enough for Pablo to decide 
to use drugs himself suggests that Pablo does not deserve to be treated as an 
autonomous self; but, if this is so, we can hardly turn around and invoke a right to 
autonomy to protect, afterwards, his decision to take drugs.  
 
In short, and to borrow a colleague’s terminology, shall we treat drug users as agents or 
as patients?19 The right to autonomy assumes the former; criminalizing the provision 
and public use of drugs, as well as compulsory rehabilitation, the latter. Nino and the 
Court oscillate between the two images, and this does not seem plausible.  
 
 
4. Mere Decriminalization? 
 
The Constitution includes various levels of protection of human actions depending on 
their impact on the interests of others, how important they are for the person who 
performs them, and their connection with different constitutional values. The lowest 
level of protection is granting a right not to be criminally prosecuted for that action. But 
not criminalizing an action does not amount to authorizing it. Absence of punishment 
does not mean that the State is under the obligation to protect such action from third 
party interference, much less facilitate or guaranty its performance; it only means that 
the Constitution prohibits that such action be criminally punished. The grounds for that 
                                                 




minimal protection may be diverse. In general, they relate to the fact that the action, 
while objectionable, is not sufficiently reproachable, or that punishment would be 
useless, even counterproductive.  
 
It might be thought that it is under that light that we should interpret the Court in 
Arriola when, enigmatically, it asserts (and, literally, underlines) that the decision “in 
no way entails legalizing drugs”20. Judging that the drug user must not be incarcerated 
does not imply that the State should be committed to further protection of her conduct. 
Thus, it could be argued, drug use is not an authorized action –it is merely a 
decriminalized one.  
 
This reading would explain why the Court accepts the intrusive measures described in 
the previous section, and, in Arriola, actually summons the Government to adopt them. 
It would also explain why the Court insists in describing drug use as a despicable 
conduct, while it remarks that jail is useless, in this case, from a criminal deterrence 
perspective21and, in fact, aggravates the “disease”. That is to say, this is conduct we do 
not want, but it does not justify sending someone to jail.  
 
However, such reading would not be correct. As I said, the central argument in these 
decisions is that drug use is protected by the right to autonomy set forth in article 19 of 
the Constitution. This entails far more than mere decriminalization: it is an 
authorization –a right to do something in particular, and a State obligation to protect, at 
least to some extent, such conduct.  
                                                 
20Arriola, par. 27 of the first opinion. 
21 The empirical analysis of Arriola is singularly weak, as I argue in “El maximalismo en las 




To illustrate the point, let us suppose that the conduct in issue is not drug use but 
abortion in case of rape, a question which has given rise to intense debate in Argentina 
for years, and which was recently addressed by the Supreme Court.22 Regarding that 
conduct, we might think that there are, potentially, three forms of protection,23from the 
lowest to the highest. As a first option, not to criminally prosecute the woman; as a 
second option, to grant her a right to do it; as a third option, to recognize a right to 
obtain effective access to the action at stake. In the first option, the assumption is that 
the action is objectionable, but not serious enough for the woman to face incarceration. 
In this scenario, there could be no protest if the Government prosecuted, for example, 
the intervening physicians. At the other end of the spectrum, in the third option, the 
assumption is that any woman who wishes to have an abortion in such circumstances 
must be able to do it, and therefore the State must provide the material means –public 
healthcare– to guarantee it. 
 
The second option is obviously in between. It does not amount to a guarantee of 
effective access, and accordingly does not entail the provision of free healthcare, but it 
seems undeniable that the State must nevertheless refrain from, for instance, criminally 
prosecuting the intervening physicians, and, arguably, must regulate in a restrictive 
manner objection of conscience.24 It goes without saying, neither of these two State 
obligations would make any sense under the first scenario – mere decriminalization. 
Once we acknowledge we are before an action protected by a right, we might debate if 
it is a stronger or weaker right, but certain things should be beyond discussion.  
                                                 
22 “F., A. L. s/ medida autosatisfactiva”, 13 de marzo de 2012. 
23 In truth, forms of protection do not fall neatly in just three categories; it is rather a more fluent 
continuum, as I will later claim. I use the three option framework here just to emphasize 
difference that could be present at each level of protection. 




In this sense, although it does not follow from the existence of a right that we must 
embrace the third option, the State should at the very least refrain from adopting 
measures which impede or substantially hamper the realization of the conduct protected 
by this right. If there is a right to have an abortion in certain circumstances, we cannot 
tolerate that the State prosecute those who perform the actions that are instrumentally 
necessary for enjoying such right, namely, the physicians performing the abortion.  
 
The analogy to drug use is clear. If we believe there is a right to use drugs as part of our 
autonomy, we cannot prosecute drug provision, which is instrumentally necessary to 
perform the conduct protected by such right. The fact that drugs can be found all the 
same is no valid answer for the State, since that is so despite its attempts to prevent it. 
Moreover, it could not be claimed that the State adequately protects this right if it 
pushes the user to the illegal market as the only way to access the drug. True, there is 
the possibility of growing your own drug, but such activity is also illegal today, and it is 
not a feasible option for many users, not even in the case of marijuana.  
 
Along the same lines, if I have a right to use drugs as part of my autonomy, this should 
necessarily imply that I have a right that the State should not seize the drugs I possess in 
order to use them; but, as I said, the State is under the duty to do so as long as provision 
is forbidden, since the drug is a good illegally obtained. It would be ironic, to say the 
least, to claim that there is a right to use drugs, while the substance that makes such 
action possible is seized and destroyed every time the supposedly legal user is found in 




It is important to insist that the existence of a right does not entail that the State must 
guarantee effective access to it. A few decades ago, this distinction would have been put 
in terms of negative versus positive rights. Such conceptual framework is no longer 
popular; today, it seems more pertinent to claim, with Holmes and Sunstein, that “all 
rights are positive.”25 Although this is undoubtedly true in more than one sense, we 
should not forget that only in some cases the State must effectively provide the material 
means required for the enjoyment of a right, while in others it discharges its 
constitutional duty by doing less than that. As in every case involving scarce resources, 
we should analyze how important access to the right is in light of the constitutional 
values involved.26 For example, the right to education, given its connection to 
democracy27and structural equality of opportunity,28 clearly entails such further duty, 
but nothing I have said so far should lead us to think the same applies to drug use. 
Indeed, I do not believe there is an obligation to provide free drugs or otherwise 
subsidize access to them. However, it seems to be undeniable that the State is not 
honoring its duty to protect the right at stake if it prohibits the action that constitutes a 
necessary antecedent for its enjoyment, namely, drug provision.  
 
For this reason, criminalization of drug provision is inconsistent with the protection of 
drug use under the right to autonomy. However, until now I have only pointed out that 
Nino and the Court recognize such right; it is now time to critically assess if they are 
right. Can we actually consider that there is a right to take drugs as part of our personal 
autonomy? The following section analyzes this question.  
                                                 
25Holmes and Sunstein, The Cost of Rights. Why Liberty Depends on Taxes (1999).  
 
26 I discuss this issue in Escasez e igualdad. Los derechos sociales en la Constitución (2008).  
27See Thurgood Marshall’s dissent opinion in San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 





5. Autonomous Drug Use 
 
Reasons to doubt whether the right to autonomy can protect drug use derive from the 
very arguments Nino and the Court offer to justify prosecuting provision and public use, 
and which give rise to the paradoxical situation I described. The right to autonomy 
presupposes the existence of an agent who is in command of her actions and chooses 
her life plan with a reasonable degree of freedom. We could hardly deem as free the 
action of an automaton with no will who is not the subject of his life, but rather the 
object of someone else’s. In other words, if the portrait of the drug user to which 
Petracchi resorts in order to defend punishing provision of drugs were accurate, 
autonomy could not be the right involved in this case.  
 
Actually, the right to autonomy could be ruled out even if we were not before a drug 
addict whose free will was severely compromised: it would suffice that the conduct in 
issue had the effect of substantially limiting future autonomy. Those who find autonomy 
a central value are nevertheless willing to accept restricting certain actions that, 
although free, tend to curtail autonomy in a substantial way, especially if they do so for 
good. This is the reason why liberals in general refuse to allow people to freely choose 
to sell themselves to slavery.29 To provide a more contemporary example, the argument 
                                                 
29 The classic liberal argument on this issue is John Stuart Mill’s:  
“By selling himself for a slave, he abdicates his liberty; he foregoes any future use of it beyond 
that single act. He therefore defeats, in his own case, the very purpose which is the justification 
of allowing him to dispose of himself.... The principle of freedom cannot require that he should 
be free not to be free. It is not freedom to be allowed to alienate his freedom”. (On Liberty, 
1859, p. 158). 
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could apply to the autonomous decision to irrevocably waive the right to divorce.30 In 
these cases, there are good reasons to believe that the principle of autonomy does not 
protect such conducts –indeed, it rather provides grounds for their restriction. Limiting 
freedom can be, on occasions, a way of protecting it.31 
 
Therefore, not only when the conduct is not free due to the effects of drugs, but also 
when it seems likely that drugs will significantly restrict future freedom, arguments 
based on a right to autonomy lack any strength. The right to autonomy presupposes that 
the agent is acting with enough discernment as to attribute the action to her in a 
meaningful way. The argument used by the Argentine Court to criminalize drug 
provision, in turn, presupposes precisely the opposite: that the drug user is a kind of 
automaton with no free will.  
 
However, there is no need to pick only one of the two images to portray the drug user. It 
may be the case that both are to some degree applicable, but refer to different situations. 
The portrait of the automaton with no free will captures the drug addict whose will, so 
to speak, has been kidnapped by drugs. Although, as I said, it makes no sense to invoke 
autonomy here, this extreme situation cannot be generalized to all drug users. Many 
among them may probably fit better the other portrait, that of the autonomous agent 
who decides, with reasonable freedom, to take drugs as part of his life plan.32 
 
                                                 
30 “Sisto y Franzini s/ información sumaria”, Fallos 321: 92. Similarly, in Sejean(1986), the 
Court defended the possibility of “making a mistake” as a foundation for the right to get a 
divorce, which right was not part of Argentina’s matrimonial regime at the time.  
31 The classic argument in the area of freedom of speech is Fiss, The Irony of Free Speech 
(1996).  
32As Neil Levy claims, “The perfectly virtuous agent, who desires only what she judges she 
ought to, may be an ideal agent… but we do not have to aspire to such heights in order to count 
as autonomous.” Levy, “Autonomy and Addiction”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 36, 
No. 3, September 2006. 
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Furthermore, portraits of drug users may be far more than two, since it seems mistaken 
to address the issue of autonomy as an all-or-nothing one. Autonomy is a question of 
degree. The act of using drugs may be, depending on the case, a more or less voluntary 
conduct, and constitutional protection based on a right to autonomy should vary 
accordingly.  
 
However, for this gradual approach to be reflected in concrete regulation, an adequate 
proxy of how free the decision to use drugs is, and to what extent it will affect future 
freedom, becomes necessary. This, I believe, may be achieved in a reasonably precise 
manner by focusing on the drug in issue. Exploring in any detail the characteristics of 
different drugs is beyond the framework of this paper. It can be noted, however, that 
there is consistent empirical evidence indicating that users of marijuana do not suffer 
from addiction or lasting cognitive impairments.33At least in the case of this drug, 
therefore, it seems clear that there are no sufficient reasons to presume across the board 
that the user has, or will likely have, his free will compromised by the effects of the 
drug. This means, in turn, that it is not justified to exclude the marijuana user from the 
full protection of the right to autonomy. Perhaps only in the case of opiates, the 
withdrawal syndrome is sufficiently intense to evoke the image of the automaton with 
no free will that Petracchi offers, but it is not necessary to reach that stage for autonomy 
to be compromised.34 
 
                                                 
33Zimmer and Morgan, Marijuana Myths, Marijuana Facts, cited in Husak, “Liberal Neutrality, 
Autonomy, and Drug Prohibitions”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 29, no. 1 (Winter 
2000), p. 72.  
34Husak, ob. cit., p. 73. For a general discussion of the impact of drugs on autonomy, see Levy, 
ob. cit., and Foddy and Savulescu, “Autonomy, Addiction and the drive to Pleasure: Designing 
Drugs and Our Biology: A reply to Neil Levy”, Bioethics, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2006.  
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In any case, from the fact that the conduct does not fit the right to autonomy it does not 
follow that criminalization is justified. Article 19 does not protect only autonomous 
behavior, but rather reaches a wider category: private actions, defined as actions that do 
not harm others. Actions that are not just private but autonomous are protected, as Nino 
says, from any State interference; those which are private yet not autonomous enjoy a 
lesser protection. Thus, as the degree of autonomy of the action decreases, greater 
interference may be admitted. 
 
The lowest level of protection is decriminalization: at the very least, any private action, 
that is, any action that does not harm others, is protected from criminal punishment. 
Article 19 does not admit that an action which is harmless to others should be punished 
with the most severe form of State interference. However, other types of interference 
affecting the individual’s ability to perform a private action may be justified, as long as 
they are linked to the fulfillment of specific State obligations. In the next section, I will 
analyze which such obligations could be.  
 
 
6. The State Obligation to Protect Health 
 
Does the right to autonomy include a right to commit suicide or let yourself die? The 
grounds of Bazterrica, to which Arriola refers, suggest so; but such an assertion has 
never been made as holding of a Supreme Court decision. In 1993, in Bahamondez,35the 
Court was precisely faced with such issue, but chose not to address it. The case dealt 
with the situation of a Jehovah’s Witness who needed a blood transfusion but refused it 
                                                 
35 Fallos 316:47. 
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for religious reasons. Since this attitude would likely lead to the patient’s death, the 
hospital resorted to the courts for guidance –should it let him die, or forcefully give him 
blood? By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, the case was moot, for the 
patient had recovered without the transfusion. The majority of the Court preferred to 
refrain from deciding the substantive issue, precisely because the case had become 
moot.36 In dissent, and arguing that it was essential to provide guidance for future cases, 
some Justices chose to declare that the patient’s will had to be respected. The matter has 
never reached the Supreme Court again. A Court of Appeals, in a similar case 
(Gallacher37), followed the dissenters in Bahamondez and let the patient die for her 
religious beliefs.38 
 
The dissenters in Bahamondez and the Court of Appeals in Gallacher stressed the fact 
that the reasons to reject the treatment were religious. While for some judges the 
relevance of the religious motives related to freedom of religion, for others the key was 
that there could be no doubts that the decision was genuine –autonomous– because it 
was in line with the life plan the patient had generally and stably embraced. Under this 
second reading, religious beliefs were not relevant in themselves, but were rather an 
indicator of the robustness of the patients decision. This seems to be in line with the 
claim I made above that the more autonomous the decision, the stronger the 
constitutional protection it deserves. In cases where the person’s autonomy is 
substantially compromised by drug use, arguments in favor of allowing self-harming 
conduct are weak. As I said, protection from “any State interference” only reaches 
                                                 
36 This seems a clear example of the “passive virtues” cherished by Bickel in The Least 
Dangerous Branch, and more recently by Sunstein, in his profuse defense of minimalism.  
37 “Dr. Gallacher s/ autorización”, Cámara Nacional Civil sala G, 1995. ED, 1995, 164-651. 
38 In Gallacher, the patient had two young children, which circumstance had been mentioned by 
the dissenters in Bahamondez as a relevant one when citingAmerican precedents, but which was 
not present in that case.  
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actions which are both private and autonomous; as the action becomes less autonomous, 
the State obligation to protect health gains power.  
 
The right to health has been the star of social rights judicial enforcement in Argentina 
since the late 90s, and courts have frequently insisted on the existence of a correlative 
State obligation to take positive action to protect health, whether providing medicines, 
financing treatments –not only in the country, but also abroad–39, renovating hospitals, 
or producing vaccines. In the face of such a robust right, the State cannot remain a 
passive bystander when someone is inflicting severe harm upon himself.  
 
What should the State do in such situation?  As I said, constitutional protection of 
private actions prohibits that a person be incarcerated as long as her conduct does not 
harm others. But other, milder forms of State intervention are not only permitted, but 
even mandatory. The intensity of such measures shall depend upon two factors: the 
degree of autonomy of the person, which determines to what extent Article 19 protects 
this conduct, and the degree of harm the person is causing to herself, which determines 
the strength of the State’s duty to protect health.  
 
If the drug in issue is one whose use fits the right to autonomy, the level of interference 
tolerated under article 19 must be similar to the regulation tobacco or alcohol –namely, 
severe restrictions on advertising, public campaigns, heavy sale taxes, and the like, but 
probably nothing else. Marijuana, as I claimed, belongs in that category. However, in 
the case of more harmful and autonomy-restricting drugs, more intense State 
interference is permissible, even required. Such interference may consist, depending on 
                                                 
39 I criticize the decision that declares that the Government has to pay for medical treatments 
abroad in “El control de las políticas sociales”, in press.  
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the circumstances, in seizing and destroying the drug, prohibiting provision, and, in the 
worst cases of addiction, compulsory detoxification treatments.  
 
In fact, in such extreme cases, we might not even face a private action. The concept of 
action presupposes a degree of will which the extreme addict may have lost. In such 
scenario, therefore, article 19 no longer seems applicable. However, even if we rule out 
article 19, there is still a “residual” right to decriminalization that protects the extreme 
addict. As in the case of permissible interference in the less autonomous forms of drug 
use, the justification for this right to decriminalization is rooted in the right to health. 
One of the opinions in Arriola, Carlos Fayt’s, puts us in the right track. Fayt’s argument 
is simple, and can be summarized as follows: 1. Drug users suffer from an illness. 2. 
The State is under the obligation to protect health. 3. Incarceration does not cure said 
illness:  it makes it worse. 4. Ergo, the State cannot incarcerate drug users. As I said, I 
think that treating all users as people suffering from an illness is a mistaken 
generalization. But it is undeniable that some –the extreme addicts– are. To them, the 
right to health argument is fully applicable. The addict who cannot stop using a drug 
that is killing her has a right to be free from prosecution not because she has a right to 
use drugs –in this case, she does not–, but because her right to health bars the State from 
treating her in that way.  
 
Someone might argue that, since it is impossible in practical terms to distinguish sale to 
addicts from sale to non-addicts, we had better prohibit sale in general. However, as I 
mentioned, the problem of addiction seems to be circumscribed to certain drugs. Of 
course, sale of such drugs might be criminally punished. After all, in such cases there is 
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no right to autonomy involved, and therefore the State has no reason to refrain from 





Rights, like children and books, have a life of their own. When, in the turbulent 80s, the 
more liberal Argentine scholars and judges defended that drug use could not be 
criminalized, they set the basis for a way of interpreting the Constitution that today, 
despite some hesitation and resistance, seems dominant. However, as I argued in this 
paper, the implications of that interpretation are not necessarily the ones its authors 
foresaw. If my argument is correct, article 19 (“the master beam of Argentine law,” 
according to one of the opinions in Arriola40) has a wider scope than the doctrine in 
force acknowledges, and, in conjunction with other relevant rights, imposes an approach 
to drugs which defers from the present one.  
 
Specificities of drug regulation depend upon a detailed analysis, free from improper 
generalizations regarding different drugs, and backed up by robust empirical data. 
Although such an analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, it is worthwhile going 
through the main conclusions I reached. They, I believe, should determine the guiding 
principles of such regulation.  
 
In some cases, using drugs is an autonomous action which, as such, deserves full 
protection under the right to autonomy. I find no reasons to exclude use of marijuana 
                                                 
40Zaffaroni’s opinion in Arriola, par. 12. 
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from this category –certainly not at a general level. This not only implies that the action 
cannot be prosecuted, but also that the Sate must refrain from preventing or 
substantially hampering its performance. Criminal prosecution of provision, in these 
cases, is inconsistent with such obligation. However, measures such as those imposed 
on tobacco and alcohol may be enforced, including provisions regarding to whom, when 
and where this drug can be sold. Restrictions on certain forms of public use may be 
admissible as well, like in the case of tobacco, not for fear of the contagion effect –
which, I claimed, could only apply if we assumed that autonomy was compromised–, 
but because we might be concerned about the effect of smoke on other people’s health.  
 
In turn, when the characteristics of the drug at stake allow us to presume in general that 
its use restricts autonomy, protection from State interference decreases accordingly. The 
State is under the obligation to prevent harms to health. To the extent that a self-
inflicted harm is not the consequence of an autonomous decision in which affecting 
health is an inevitable consequence of a freely chosen life style, the State should 
endeavor to prevent it by hampering access to the drug and limiting the opportunities of 
using it. In extreme situations, compulsory treatments may proceed.  
 
Yet in no case is the criminalization of drug use constitutionally acceptable. Even when 
the drug restricts autonomy, its use is protected under article 19 –not as autonomous 
conduct, but as a private action harmless to others. Several forms of State interference 
are consistent with this lower protection, but criminalization is not. The highest level of 




Finally, there are cases in which the use of drugs does not even qualify for this lower 
protection reserved for private actions, because the depth of the addiction prevents us 
from considering the conduct in issue an action in the relevant sense. Here (but only 
here) enters Petracchi’s automaton. Once in this stage, and having ruled out article 19, 
reasons to exclude criminalization derive from the duty to protect health. These reasons, 
which were already present in cases where autonomy was moderately compromised, 
become compelling when the automaton is concerned. It would be a mistake, however, 
to generalize from worst case scenarios, and to model the regulation of such a complex 
and nuanced phenomenon as drugs on the basis of an exception. 
 
